The Haqqani Network: Terrorists or Insurgents

The definition of act of terrorist act is broad and open to interpretation. Hoffman, in his obligate Inside act of terrorism, suggests that terrorism is the cut into foundation and exploitation of fear through strength or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. Schwartz, Dunkel, et al, define terrorism in their Studies in negate & angstrom unit terrorism article entitled act of terrorism An identicalness Theory Perspective, as the deliberate targeting of civilian sites for attacks stilbestroligned to result in destruction of those sites and/or the injury and ending of no(prenominal)combatant civilians. Together, these two perspectives coupled with per give-and-takeal individualism theory and w complainting act as the basis for an evaluation of the Haqqani interlock and their inter familys and interactions with cognize terrorist themes much(prenominal) as the Taliban and al-Qaida as rise up as with Pakistans military and giving medication new sworthiness agencies.The Haqqani Network Who Are They and why do We C atomic number 18? The Haqqani interlocking is an Afghanistanistani and Pakistani meeting of fighters that operates primarily in s come inheastern Afghanistan as a semi-autonomous office of the Taliban with coterminous ties to Pakistans Army and science agencies (Rassler et al. July 14, 2011, p. -2). The Haqqani nets leading mental synthesis is hierarchical in nature with members of the paterfamiliass family filling top leadership portions (Rassler et al. July 14, 2011, p. 7). This familial structure is an important ethnical identity marker that arouse serve to promote terrorist activities. Furthermore, Schwartz, Dunkel, et al address the family as it relates to upholding honor and avenging wrongs strikee to the family. This is interesting because til now those who sympathize and certification terrorism, only when dont rattling participate in it, often share the same train of companionable ide ntity based upon their group affiliations.This tends to show how the Haqqani profits is able to manage its influence over their colleague groups without actually having to be in control of them. It appears to be a symbiotic relationship where the Haqqani meshing clearly benefits from bi-directional credibility of association with the Taliban and al-Qaida. Rassler et al support this claim when they discuss the relationship between senior Haqqani network leaders and their close operational relationships with the Taliban and al-Qaida, revealing that in that celebrate is often no distinction.This dual-lane identity-based continuative legitimizes the Haqqani network with the segment of the Afghan nine that believes in radical Islam and jihad. This was evidenced when the Haqqani network helped sustain al-Qaidas relevance and mark as the leader of the globular jihadist movement. all told in all, it appears the Haqqani network just wants their proverbial place at the table so t o speak. Clearly, it must be working, as true assessments put the strength of the group close to 15,000 fighters. The Haqqani Network Duplicity at WorkAmerican intelligence and military officials claim the Haqqani network is a proxy force used by the Pakistani intelligence service Pakistans Inter-Service Intelligence ISI agency to carry out grisly, high-profile attacks. The indecision here is whether this is a relationship of convenience or an alliance due to divided up identity. The secret relationship with ISI coupled with tie in to al-Qaida and the Taliban clearly shows the need to solicit support (e. g. , material, financial, spiritual, etc. ) and ultimately rally the great deal behind them.Furthermore, for decades, the Haqqani network has been a instruct to Arab, Uzbek, Chechen, Turkish, and Pakistani jihadists. These associations speak to the core of overlap identity and the interactions among the groups, as according to Schwartz, Dunkel, et al social and cultural ide ntity is create when members come together based upon earthy beliefs shared across the group, and individual identity represents individual(prenominal)ly chosen determinations, values, and beliefs coupled with their perspectives of the certainism around them.The study of terrorism necessitates (according to Schwartz, Dunkel, et al) that we non only understand the effects of identity, but also the interactions among these levels. In addition, we need to weigh at the importance of the wider community as Schwartz, Dunkel, et al put it, Without local, and sometimes planetary support, those engaged in terrorist attacks would find it good more difficult, if not impossible, to conduct their activities. running(a) with the Taliban, al-Qaida, and Pakistans ISI is a duplicitous division that provides credibility within, and across, multiple dimensions of jihad (Rassler et al.July 14, 2011, p. 5) establishing the shared identity necessary to imbue respect and connectivity as part of an influential group dynamic. Why is all this important? The Haqqani networks credibility in the region, peculiarly with the tribal groups of Afghanistan, helps extend the Talibans delve and because the Haqqani network is effective militarily, they act as a force multiplier for the Taliban. This puts the Haqqani network in a regional leadership position, and Schwartz, Dunkel, et al suggest that this leadership role would be considered admirable providing further social capital.The Haqqani Network Terrorist Threat or insurgency? So with such a epochal fighting force that is radicalized, is the Haqqani network a terrorist organization pitted against western hemisphereern ideology, or is it simply an insurgency focused on eradicating outsiders who dumbfound forced their way into the Afghani homeland? According to the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the plane section of State as of family line 15, 2011, the Haqqani network is not constituteed as a foreign t errorist organization. Despite this, according to the Jamestown Foundation terrorist act Monitor, The U.S. military has long been frustrated by deadly operations carried out against its troop in Afghanistan by Haqqani Network forces. They plagiarize U. S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta as saying, We cannot have the Haqqanis coming across the border assail our forces and Afghans and disappearing back into a refuge haven in Pakistan. In between the rhetoric, the real reason they arent on the terrorist list is because at that place is a belief that, such a move would scuttle every chances that the group might make heartsease with Afghanistans government. To make our decision, it is essential that we not lose sight of the need to clean evaluate this group from the point of put on of that group and not from the air jacketernized framework we can easily apply to it. Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, point out that, Scholars insistence that terrorists are somehow not like us but, instead, abnormalinsane, supply hungry, or a combination of twois a classic exercise in out-group stereotypingwhich undermines the analytical utility of the interpretations in use. Applying this to the Haqqani network and to prevent us from being labored by our (Western) cultural boundaries, it is incumbent upon us to look at the Haqqani network from their reward point. The clearest and most-recent message came in September of 2011 when Sirajuddin Haqqani (the son of the groups patriarch, Jalaluddin Haqqani) told The Telegraph in the United Kingdom via a recall interview, There are sincere the great unwashed in the Afghan government who are loyal to the Taliban as they know our goal is the liberation of our homeland from the clutches of occupying forces. With this, their actions, and their relationships, it is presumable that the Haqqani network is interested more in the local issues and having local influence than it is in trying to wage a global jihad against the West. A such , their lack of inclusion body from the list of terrorist organizations is still valid. Bibliography Brannan, David W. , Esler, Philip F. , and Strindberg, N. T. Anders. 2001. Talking to Terrorists Towards an fencesitter Analytical Framework for the Study of knock-down-and-drag-out Substate Activism. Studies In booking & adenine terrorism 24, no. 1 3-24. Goodspeed, Peter. National Post, approximately the Haqqani network. demise circumscribed September 30, 2011. Accessed November 24, 2011. http//news. nationalpost. com/2011/09/30/about-the-haqqani-network Griffin, Emory. A First Look at Communication Theory. juvenile York The McGraw-Hill Companies, 1997. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside terrorism. New York capital of South Carolina University Press, 2006. Mazzetti, Mark, Scott Shane, and Alissa Rubin. New York Times, Brutal Haqqani law-breaking club Bedevils U. S. in Afghanistan. proceed limited September 24, 2011. Accessed November 23, 2011. http//www. nytimes. com/2011/09/25/wor ld/asia/brutal-haqqani-clan-bedevils-united-states-in-afghanistan. hypertext markup language? pagewanted=all.Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating act of terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. hold out special July 14, 2011. Accessed November 11, 2011. www. ctc. usma. edu. Shahzad, Faizul. Taliban Reject American Perceptions of the Haqqani-ISI Relationship. Terrorism Monitor. 9. no. 37 (2011) 1-2. http//www. jamestown. org/uploads/media/TM_009_Issue37. pdf (accessed November 10, 2011). Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An identicalness Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 540. Websites Referenced http//www. cfr. org http//www. tc. usma. edu http//www. dawn. com http//www. foreignaffairs. com http//www. jamestown. org http//news. nationalpost. com http//www. nytimes. com/ http//www. state. gov http//www. telegraph. co. uk http//www. thedailybeast. com http//tribune. com. pk http//www. understandingwar. org/themenode/haqqani-network 1 . Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed. ). New York, NY Columbia University Press. p. 40. 2 . Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 537-559. 3 . Ibid (p. 540)Identity theory for our purposes will cover cultural identity, social identity, and personal identity. 4 . Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. 5 . The Haqqani networks patriarch and leader is Jalaluddin Haqqani, although it is reported that he may be in ill health, and his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is running the day-to-day operations. http//www. cfr. org/afghanistan/institute-study-war-haqqani-network/p26126 6 .Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrori sm An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 542. 7 . Ibid. 8 . Ibid (p. 548) 9 . Much like the traditional phrase, viciousness by association, I suggest there could be credibility by association. It is fantasy that is often discussed in marketing whereby a person, product, or company gains credibility by associating itself with a larger more accepted person, product, or company (e. g. , a electronic computer with the Intel Inside sticker on it). 10 . Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown.The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. (p. 40) 11 . Ibid (p. 43). 12 . http//tribune. com. pk/story/259314/sirajuddin-haqqani-dares-us-to-attack-n-waziristan/ 13 . Mazzetti, Mark, Scott Shane, and Alissa Rubin. New York Times, Brutal Haqqani Crime Clan Bedevils U. S. in Afghanistan. Last modified September 24, 2011. Accessed Novembe r 23, 2011. http//www. nytimes. com/2011/09/25/world/asia/brutal-haqqani-clan-bedevils-united-states-in-afghanistan. html? pagewanted=all. 14 .Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed. ). New York, NY Columbia University Press. p. 199. 15 . Goodspeed, Peter. National Post, About the Haqqani network. Last modified September 30, 2011. Accessed November 24, 2011. http//news. nationalpost. com/2011/09/30/about-the-haqqani-network 16 . Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 540. 17 . Ibid. 18 . Ibid (p. 548) 19 . Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. (p. 13) 20 . Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 550. 21 . The current list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations contains 49 entries, but the Haqqani Network is not virtuoso of them. http//www. state. gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085. htm 22 . Faizul Shahzad, Taliban Reject American Perceptions of the Haqqani-ISI Relationship, Terrorism Monitor, 9, no. 37 (2011) 1-2, http//www. jamestown. org/uploads/media/TM_009_Issue37. pdf (accessed November